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Abstract:  
 
The article analyzes the results of nanotechnology industry (nanoindustry) development in Russia, and 
the negative and positive effects of sanctions imposed by the US, the EU and other countries in 2014-
2015. The authors substantiate the need to identify new vectors and forms of government and private 
companies’ international cooperation in research, innovation and production applying 
nanotechnology. An assessment of the Russian government policy of import substitution of materials 
and equipment for domestic nanotechnology industry in terms of their relevance is carried out. The 
necessity to increase financial and social base of nanoindustry development, reliability and diversity of 
investment sources, activation of institutes and mechanisms of nanoindustry enterprises self-regulation 
are justified. The expediency of finding additional resources and forms of sanctions countering through 
the institutes and mechanisms of integration unions (EAEU, SCO, etc.) is pointed out. The presence of 
import substitution limits in modern Russian nanoindustry is shown, which sets the task to define its 
rational boundaries in the future.  
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1. Introduction 
 
One can hardly agree with those who see only positive effect (increased motivation, 
government stimulus, growth in domestic demand and sales, etc.) of the sanctions 
against Russia. Public opinion is focused on domestic issues and underestimates the 
importance of the external problems arising. But global assessments of Russian 
nanotechnology industry (nanoindustry) current state are not overestimated or 
contrived. It should be mentioned that nanoindustry is interpreted in this study as an 
over-sectoral form of economy development based on the scaled organizing the 
standardized mass production of the new generation of goods and services, 
manufactured with the use of general purpose nanotechnology and promoted at all 
global economic system structure levels. Development of this new global 
technological mode is an extremely complicated process, which increases 
competition, forcing the participants of the process to establish barriers and impose 
sanctions, change their strategic orientations and priorities, formats and mechanisms 
of their doings associated with enormous risks not only for Russia but also for all of 
its partners in investments, projects and collaborations in the future development of 
the nanoindustry. 
 
External sanctions have already created two high barriers to nano-industrialization in 
the Russian Federation: technological and financial ones. Technological barrier 
limits the delivery of necessary equipment in its significant part, and it is difficult to 
overcome this barrier in many cases. Financial barrier has become an obstacle on the 
way to the European and American financial markets while investment needs growth 
still persists. It is hard to pull through the both barriers at the same time, taking into 
consideration not sufficiently solved problems of technological and financial aspects 
of Russian nanoindustry development. However, the barriers encountered have not 
closed the realization of projects, but made it much more complicated.  
 
The Russian Government intends to continue implementing the strategy of 
nanoindustry and its infrastructure development, considering the unfavorable global 
environment, using the methods and tools of targeted programming, of selective 
organizational and financial support for firms and projects on the country and 
regional scale, aimed at reducing dependence on imports of equipment, component 
parts and materials. 
 
In times of crisis and sanctions, opposing nano-industrialization processes in the 
Russian Federation, government intervention in economy is especially important. 
Lack of the state support for Russian nanoindustry in modern conditions can lead to 
the degradation of SR&ED (Scientific Research and Experimental Development) or 
to the use of the achieved results by foreign competitors. An important role in 
overcoming the negative trends in the national nanoindustry at this stage may also 
play initiative institutes of its development, partly replacing the institute of state, as 
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his substitutes, and partly working with him, functionally complementing it, as so-
called “completutes”. The Russian state and traditional institutes have taken a 
number of measures to facilitate the functioning of innovative enterprises in the 
domestic market, but efforts “from above” are not enough for the system creating a 
favorable environment for nano-industrialization. Only together with representatives 
of the business, the direction to move in difficult conditions of Russian economic 
development refraining can be exactly determined. This task is designed to be solved 
by cross-sectoral, regional and inter-regional associations of employers and 
employees as initiative institutes of nanoindustry development and self-regulation 
(Russian Nanoindustry Association, 2015). 
 
The financial, institutional, informational and organizational support for 
nanoindustry development is already being implemented by most of the powerful 
development institutes of the Russian Federation, while their system coordination 
has not achieved yet. A systemic interaction of general and specific, financial and 
non-financial development institutions, state and private companies on regional, 
national and global levels should be provided. This gives additional opportunities for 
effective solving the problem of sanctions confrontation and transition to the new 
trend of development of Russian nanoindustry adequate the imperatives of its 
sustainability, competitiveness and security in the global context. 
 
2. Research Objectives and Methods 
 
Research objectives of the study cover: identifying an objective picture of the state 
and vectors of development of nanotechnology industry in the Russian Federation 
(the RF) at the present stage; adopting a new strategy for the nanoindustry 
stakeholders and the mechanism of its implementation; determining the 
effectiveness of decisions and coordination of the state, institutes and companies in 
this sphere; justifying the strategic adjustment of parameters (subjects and objects, 
priorities and imperatives, landmarks and horizons, algorithms and growth) of 
Russian nanoindustry; assessing the impact of imposition of sanctions on the 
research and industrial projects implementing perspectives in nanoindustry sphere in 
the RF, the EU, the US, and other countries. 
 
The study contributes to a real assessment of effects and consequences, to prediction 
of development and minimization the specific and general risks of the global 
nanoindustry development caused by sanctions against Russia. 
 
The objectives of this study were solved applying methodology of the systems and 
evolutionary approaches to the analysis of large and complex objects as Russian 
nanoindustry taking into consideration the level of its development and the specific 
opportunistic behavior of “related groups” and the adverse impact of the external 
environment. 
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The synthesis of structural and functional, temporal and spatial, aspectual and 
comparative, statistical and documentary analysis has been realized in the research 
work. The expert’ and authors’ quantitative and qualitative evaluation of system 
dynamics and of Russian nanoindustry current state, as well as a reflection of its new 
guidelines in the strategy and actions of its stakeholders are represented in the 
article. 
 
3. Analysis Result 
 
Development of nanoindustry is not only the priority of progress, but also the 
imperative of survival in the frameworks of the global technological mode, started 
with the beginning of the century. The global nanotechnology industry will grow to 
reach 75.8 billion US dollars by 2020 (Nanotechnology Market Outlook, 2015). The 
global market of final goods and products containing nanomaterials has already 
made more than 1 trillion US dollars. It features more than 800 consumer products 
produced applying nanotechnology, and by 2020 more than 15% of the total mass of 
commodities in the world will be produced using developments in the field of 
nanotechnology (Information about the results, 2014). The expected compound 
annual growth rate (CAGR) of global nanomaterial market in 2012-2019 is 15.5%, 
from 2.0 billion US dollars to 5.5 billion dollars, respectively (Dickson, 2015). 
 
National nanoindustry formation remains the most important area of the Russian 
government policy. The achieved results of its implementing can be seen in Table 1. 
 
Table 1. Main indicators of Russian nanotechnology industry development, 2010-
2014 
 
Indicators 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Gross domestic spending on 
R&D, % of GDP 1.13 1.09 1.13 1.13 1.19 
Share of domestic spending on 
R&D in priority fields (including 
nanotechnology) in gross 
domestic spending on R&D, % 56.5 59.2 67.6 65.5 67.9 
Number of companies producing 
products related to 
nanotechnology, un, incl.: 
 
50 
 
287 
 
384 
 
518 
 
576 
Independent producers 33 240 322 440 483 
RUSNANO portfolio companies 17 34 62 78 93 
Number of developed 
nanotechnologies, un  
222 258 327 411 443 
Share of developed 
nanotechnologies in advanced 
manufacturing technologies by 
economic activity, %  25.7 
 
22.7 24.7 
 
 
 
28.8 
 
 
 
31.4 
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Number of applied 
nanotechnologies, un 354 526 748 907 937 
Nanotechnology industry output, 
RUB bn,  
incl.: 
 
117.9 
 
154.8 
 
210.7 
 
417.6 
 
756.9 
Independent producers share, % 99.1 92.7 88.8 81.7 75.3 
RUSNANO portfolio companies 
share, % 
0.9 7.3 11.2 18.3 24.7 
Nanotechnology products exports, 
RUB bn 
45.8 67.0 66.5 93.9 204.7 
Volume of sales of Russian 
nanotechnology products, RUB 
bn 
117.9 154.8 220.0 522.0 946.4 
 
Source: (Annual Report of the OJSC RUSNANO (2014); Strategy of OJSC RUSNANO 
(2013); Accounts Chamber of the Russian Federation (2013); Creating businesses. Annual 
Report (2010) 
 
For 7 years to 2015, RUSNANO Corporation (transformed from the state 
corporation into OJSC RUSNANO, RUSNANO Group, which implements state 
policy for the development of nanoindustry in Russia as a co-investor in 
nanotechnology projects) has received from the state 130 billion rubles in capital and 
180 billion rubles in state guarantees for making loans to companies, now fully 
returned. In 2015, RUSNANO project (portfolio) companies planned to invest in 
research and development activities more than 20 billion rubles (about 1/3 billion 
US dollars) (Nanoindustry in the country, 2015). RUSNANO appropriated about 23 
billion rubles on investment, and the government can appropriate 50.2 billion rubles 
grants for RUNANO in 2016-2020 and provide guarantees of about 100 billion 
rubles for RUSNANO’ loans in 2016-2019. The parameters of state support for 
OJSC RUSNANO to 2020 will be determined upon completion of the first phase of 
Russian nanoindustry development in the spring of 2016. 
 
Russian nanoindustry growth rate has been 12% per year in 2007-2014, which is 
significantly higher than the growth of GDP and industrial output in the country. 
Average labor productivity in nanoindustry enterprises is about 2 times higher than 
that of the manufacturing industry of the Russian Federation, the share of SR&ED 
costs of about 2 times higher than in the rest of the domestic economy.  
 
However, in 2013, the pace of commercialization and diffusion of nanotechnologies 
has slowed down; some enterprises have been forced to change the profile and to 
start restructuring. The Accounts Chamber of the Russian Federation data for the 
three previous years clearly shows the decline trend in the growth rate of Russian 
nanoindustry (Table 2).  
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Table 2. The planned and actual sales of Russian nanotechnology industry 
production, 2010-2012 
 
Indicators 2010  2011  2012  
Planned sales, RUB bn 155 240 340 
Actual sales, RUB bn 122 160 220 
Performing share, % 78 66 64 
 
Source: (Accounts Chamber of the Russian Federation, 2013) 
 
Under these conditions, by 2014 the following measures became urgent: accelerating 
the creation and implementation of metrological support, of systems of special 
equipment, instruments and devices; reorienting logistics channels of companies; 
seeking new financial resources and reliable partners; selecting and supporting 
diversification projects, choosing priorities of import substitution. 
 
At the beginning of 2014, the task of achieving 900 billion rubles (30 billion US 
dollars) aggregate output in Russian nanoindustry by the end of the next year, with 
the share of RUSNANO invested companies at least 300 billion rubles per year, and 
the one of independent (not subsidiary) companies – 600 billion rubles seemed to be 
problematic, but it was realized. However, is Russian nanoindustry output worth less 
than 15 billion US dollars nowadays, in conditions of the negative impact of ruble 
sharp weakening and sanctions imposing?  
 
According to the opinion of Anatoly Chubais, Chairman of the RUSNANO 
Corporation Executive Board, year 2014 “was difficult for Russian business, 
including companies in the sphere of nanoindustry” (Chubais, 2014), but 2015 has 
become a year of transitional way marks and decisions.  
 
After thinking over a new unfavorable situation and a slowdown in Russian 
nanoindustry development in 2014, the situation in the field of government 
regulation of the sphere has changed. At the present stage transformation of the 
investment guidelines for the Russian nanoindustry is carried out. RUSNANO 
appropriated about 23 billion rubles on investment in 2015, and the government can 
appropriate 50.2 billion rubles grants for RUNANO in 2016-2020 and provide 
guarantees of about 100 billion rubles for RUSNANO’ loans in 2016-2019 
(Nanoindustry in the country, 2015). The parameters of state support for OJSC 
RUSNANO to 2020 will be determined upon completion of the first phase of 
Russian nanoindustry development in the spring of 2016. 
 
The revision of government regulation of the sphere also means changing the 
proportion of domestic and foreign investors’ participation in its development. Until 
the first half of 2014 the partners’ shares in foreign direct investment in 
nanoindustry projects were as follows: 80% by the Russian investors and 20% by the 
foreign ones. Respectively, 20% of Russian business was allocated abroad: in the 
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USA, Germany, South Korea, China and other countries. The essence of the current 
strategic shift is in the transition to action, primarily through private equity funds 
(PEF), with the proportion of the capital – 50% of OJSC RUSNANO and 50% – of 
other investors. 
 
Implementing RUSNANO’s idea of establishing new investment funds takes place 
in a difficult political situation, when in fact Western sources of funding have been 
completely blocked (Rusnano has been impacted on the political situation, 2015). 
But sanctions don’t drive RUSNANO to a standstill: in the circumstances of 
difficulties encountered there is no project, stopped for this reason. National 
nanoindustry in Russia continues to expand. RUSNANO has approved a new 
development strategy until 2020, which meets current global challenges, takes into 
account the need to counter sanctions, reducing dependence on imports and provides 
for the acceleration the nanoindustrialization processes on a new financial basis by 
attracting private capital, developing public-private partnership, creating new 
investment funds with the involvement of international investors. During this period 
total capital amount for financing new investment projects raised by RUSNANO 
group into the portfolio companies and by establishing nanotechnology investment 
funds is expected to reach 150 billion rubles cumulatively (Strategy of OJSC 
Rusnano, 2013). 
 
The transition to a new strategy is uneven, it reveals the idealism of intentions, 
institutional and other barriers, contradictions in the interests of the partners, 
opportunism in fulfilling their obligations. Creation of the first fund of such a kind 
(14 billion rubles) was planned in 2014 as a result of the European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) participation refusal in the framework of 
the policy of sanctions against Russia. Later, the reorientation of the Russian 
Federation on partners from China and Southeast Asia has been held. RUSNANO 
established a subsidiary company CIRTech RN GP Limited in Hong Kong for the 
purpose of development and search of ambitious project to invest in HT-sphere 
together with the Asian partners. 
 
At the beginning of 2015 RUSNANO signed an agreement with partners from China 
to establish a joint investment fund with the input of each party of 150 million US 
dollars (or 7.4 billion rubles), but the project has not been implemented. RUSNANO 
and Tsinghua Holdings Co., Ltd. (China) agreed to establish a joint fund of 
investment in start-ups in Israel, whose products will be used in the Russian 
economy. It is assumed that each party will contribute to the fund at 80 million US 
dollars. 
 
Then RUSNANO decided to create an investment fund at 12 billion rubles with 
SMP Bank (Russia) instead of the EBRD. Joining the project of SMP Bank, as being 
under the sanctions, seemed logical. It was assumed that partners will invest in the 
fund at 5.94 billion rubles; another 120 million rubles will enclose the newly 
established management company. For 3 years the fund size is expected to be 
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increased to 30 billion rubles at the expense of other partners have not yet found – 
both Russian and foreign, but the project is not yet implemented (Salmanov, 2015).
 
 
 
In the fall of 2015 accelerating the recovery processes of strategic trend of 
nanoindustrialization in the Russian Federation until 2025 has begun. Exactly then 
RusHydro, RUSNANO and Far East Development Fund signed an agreement of 
intent to set up an investment fund for direct investment. The participants apply a 
special form of financial technology – an investment partnership in which the first 
contributions by RusHydro and RUSNANO will amount to 2.4 billion rubles each. 
The fund will invest in electric power and related industries projects in the Far East 
of the Russian Federation (East Economic Forum, 2015).  
 
In the United States RUSNANO ventures fund up to 235 million US dollars can be 
also established. The idea has been approved by the Board of Directors of OJSC 
RUSNANO, but the official decision would be made at the general meeting of 
shareholders, as the Fund will consolidate RUSNANO project companies operating 
in the United States and Canada (Venture fund Rusnano, 2015). 
 
Priorities of investment funds with foreign partners, establishing by RUSNANO on 
the principle of parity optimization of the deposits structure, – are investments in 
technology-oriented companies in nanoindustry that are developing production in 
the field of import substitution and increasing export potential of Russia. 
 
The current systemic problem of Russian nanoindustry is a gap between the need to 
conduct SR&ED of proper quality and the ability to ensure the creation of promising 
groundwork in this area while infrastructure is critically weak. This problem hinders 
the achievement of domestic firms’ required level of competitiveness, sustainability 
and security on the fast growing global markets for goods and services with nano 
features. Russian nanoindustry infrastructure is being created as a national network 
model consisting of organizations of various organizational and legal forms, 
carrying out fundamental and applied research and commercialization of 
technologies. Their activities are coordinated by the Government at the cross-
sectoral level. The weakest link of nanoindustry sphere remains the logistics of 
research and development and of production of goods with nano features. 
 
Import substitution policy favoring nanoindustry should have been launched at the 
beginning of the 2000s when the global transition to a new (nanotechnology sheaf 
and NBIC convergence based) technological mode was started. Under the conditions 
of contradictory unity of global forms of cooperation and competition, it is crucial to 
maintain sustainability and security of a national economy by restraining imports 
and dependence on imports within the acceptable range. Moreover, it is necessary to 
limit the openness of nanoindustry sector to save competitive advantage and provide 
a leading position in certain segments of the global markets for nanoindustry goods. 
Such a policy should not be rigidly linked to economic sanctions of the modern 
period. 
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The logic of joining Russia in the new technological and corresponding socio- 
economic mode has inevitably obliged the country to develop domestic production 
for the nanoindustry technological platform. Providing the proportionate developing 
of human, technical, financial, institutional, organizational and informational capital 
(taking into consideration cash and in kind forms of corresponding factors of 
production) becomes the mandatory condition of nano-industrialization. 
Unfortunately, now the purpose of the statements of the import substitution for the 
Russian nanoindustry as burning priority, especially among politicians, is often just 
a kind of populism. However, import substitution has its advantages and 
disadvantages, its potential is limited; it generates positive and negative externalities 
and internalities for participants of external transactions in the sphere of circulation 
of goods and services for nanoindustry. 
 
In 2014, in many cases, foreign partner companies and financial institutions in the 
sphere of nanoindustry reduced the possibility of cooperation, hindered discussions 
of transactions, since, in their opinion, an unstable political situation took place. 
Although embargo was not announced, but concerns to work with companies in 
Russia was persisted. This situation had a negative impact on the dynamics of the 
Russian nanoindustry evolution. The fall of the ruble against the dollar affected the 
industry in two ways: on the one hand, there was a serious, heavy blow for the 
projects of Russian companies with the need for the imported equipment and the 
import contracts already signed. On the other hand, the shift in exchange rate for 
export-oriented nanotechnological projects (which brought more than 90 billion 
rubles in 2014) is “just happiness fallen down from the sky providing a double 
income for the same amount of revenue” (Chubais, 2015). 
 
The need for the partial substitution of imported equipment, materials and 
information providing Russian nanoindustry development is indisputable to ensure 
domestic companies competitiveness in the global markets in the future. A presence 
of similar goods that have at least similar quality characteristics on the Russian 
market has become a limitation to the process of such a substitution and of import 
goods refusal.  
 
For industries where such analogues or alternatives with similar characteristics are 
available, the introducing of the preferences for the use of domestic equipment will 
force businesses to develop production. 
 
For example, in Russian vacuum technology industry situation with domestic 
counterparts is quite complicated. At present stage, the existing Russian technologies 
lag behind the foreign ones, and it may take years to change the situation. It should 
be understood that in recent decades foreign partners have successfully conducted 
research and development, incorporating the results into production development. 
Thus, Intech Analytics, one of the largest companies in the market for vacuum 
equipment, is engaged in import deliveries, providing numerous long-term projects 
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based on foreign equipment applying, which has no Russian analogues. Sanctions 
cause a lot of problems for company’s customers, because their projects are either 
approved or are being currently negotiated, and for many of them budget funding 
has been already allocated. In order to ensure meeting the obligations undertaken, 
the company is forced to increase the stock of goods in warehouses, providing 
customers’ orders for at least 6 months in advance. 
 
Forming modern and reliable production systems at the Russian public and private 
enterprises in the nuclear, aerospace and other industries requires delivery of the 
high-quality vacuum components. Therefore, imposing total import substitution in 
the vacuum industry is not appropriate at this point of time. Therefore, total import 
substitution in the vacuum industry is not appropriate at this point in time (Lovtsyus 
et al., 2014). 
 
For one thing, the sanctions have not yet affected the industry of analytical 
instrumentation for investigation of topography and mechanical properties of 
nanomaterials. There are no administrative or political restrictions implemented by 
the Unites States and the European Union, or by the Russian Federation. The 
dynamic exports of Russian appliances to the markets of these countries are taking 
place as well as the imports of nanotechnologies measuring instruments from there. 
 
But then, the imposition of sanctions is manifested indirectly in the form of 
containment or reduction of funding for potential customers of our equipment, since 
many of them have the status of the budget organizations (educational and research 
ones). The offset of reducing the number of Russian customers is conducted by 
increasing the share of exports of our products. There again, the implementation of 
sanctions may be noticed as the containment or reduction of funding of potential 
customers of Russian equipment, since many of them are budget organizations 
(education institutions and research organizations). Domestic exporters have even 
benefited under the dollar exchange growth against ruble in 2014-2015. 
 
The sanctions topic is hardly discussed in the negotiations on specific export-import 
transactions, but delays in deliveries of some components from abroad take place. It 
is not only the case of sanctions, although suppliers now use the problem exists as a 
cover to their issues with conscientiousness and imperfect logistics management. 
This is true for those companies that import goods and equipment for nanoindustry, 
for example, from China either using the traditional channels or reorienting them.  
 
However, despite the difficulties, there are significant breakthroughs in this area. 
The RUSNANO’s portfolio company «OCSiAl» (Novosibirsk) has created the 
world's first scalable industrial production technology of single walled carbon 
nanotubes with the costs of production about 75 times lower than that of known 
analogues. In the next 2-3 years it is expected to achieve the annual output of the 
product at 30-40 tons, while the supply on the world market amounted to only 2 tons 
in 2014.  
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The 12th RUSNANO Nanocenter (Center for nanotechnology and nanomaterials of 
the RUSNANO network) was founded in the Republic of Mordovia (the Russian 
Federation). The main purposes of the center are commercializing innovative 
nanotechnologies, launching start-ups and transforming them into successful high-
tech businesses. By the time of the center’s launching, 49 projects on power 
electronics, lighting engineering, instrumentation, nanomaterials in the construction 
have been approved. They will be implemented in cooperation with foreign partners. 
The total Nanocenter’s budget amounts 1.97 billion rubles, including 1.15 billion 
rubles of RUSNANO’ Fund for Infrastructure and Educational Programs 
investments (The 12th Center of nanotechnology, 2015). 
 
The first manufacturing of telecommunication optical fiber has also been launched 
in the Russian Federation. The project was implemented by the RUSNANO’s 
portfolio company JSC “Fiber optic systems”, with the participation of 
Gazprombank and the government of the Republic of Mordovia. It is the 60
th
 plant 
built by RUSNANO in Russia. Until now Russia’s demand in fiber has been met 
completely by imports. The capacity of the plant (2.4 million km of 
telecommunication optical fiber per year) will allow reducing imports by 50% in the 
first years and almost doubling the output in the next 2-3 years. The project cost is 
2.7 billion rubles including 1.3 billion rubles of RUSNANO investment. The 
government support has allowed launching the project in a short time and providing 
incentives for import substitution in the sphere of fiber optics (The 60th Rusnano 
plant, 2015). 
 
The import substitution of goods for Russian nanoindustry is a very complex and 
broad-scale issue affecting the overall national nanoindustry activities – from 
megascience centers (MSC), and centers for collective use (CCU), clusters and 
special economic zones of technological innovation and industrial type to individual 
enterprises of nanoindustry and of all types of its infrastructure, research groups and 
employees. 
 
Despite the lag in the production of consumer goods, Russian manufacturers remain 
the leaders in the production of critically important goods based on the newest 
aerospace, military and nuclear technologies. These products are difficult to buy on 
the scale required reliably, profitably and safely on the global markets. The striking 
example is the incident with the contract for the two Mistral helicopter carriers’ 
supply which had been signed in June 2011 between DCNS group (France) and 
Rosoboronexport (Russia). Return on compensation for contract non-fulfillment for 
the Russian Federation is still uncertain, but due to changes in exchange rates a 
double offset in the ruble mass has been got. 
 
In order to achieve industrial scale in the branches of strategic importance providing 
Russian Federation leadership on the global scale in the present and the future, for 
the past 15 years technological base modernization is being held. This process also 
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covers production of a part of equipment that is not only inferior, but in many ways 
is superior to foreign analogues; this conclusion has been confirmed by a number of 
comparative tests. At the same time marketing and advertising areas are lagged 
behind; brands of domestic goods based on nanotechnology are not yet developed. 
This problem concerns not only to technical devices or the scientific equipment and 
special nanomaterials, but especially to consumer goods such as textiles, 
medicaments, household appliances, cosmetics etc. 
 
Import substitution of equipment or component products for Russian nanoindustry 
and its infrastructure expands customer choice opportunities by enabling them to 
find more effective solutions based on comparisons and experience. Sometimes the 
superiority of foreign import analogues is only an “advertising bubble” inflated with 
huge investments and foreign brand managers’ efforts. In these particular cases fast 
import substitution is possible by expanding already adjusted production scales and 
promoting goods on the domestic and foreign markets. 
 
At the time of purchase the imported appliance for SR&ED or manufacturing 
nanotechnology it is often almost impossible to estimate its working functions and 
effectiveness as well as the results obtained until the user buys it and sets to work. In 
addition, the commodity complexes and the devices and equipment maintenance in 
the sphere of nanoindustry are developed insufficiently. The procedure of getting a 
high-quality maintenance and skilled consultancy servicing on the running of a 
majority of imported equipment, its integrated or combined applying in research 
process is very complicated and expensive in nanotech sphere. Such problems do not 
become acute in case with domestic analogues due to the ease of approbating and 
supplying the necessary domestic materials, tools, devices and equipment without 
significant growth in customers’ costs. 
 
The import substitution policy in the sphere of services for nanoindustry does not 
really matter, as the main means of ensuring security, service and support to set up 
production at domestic enterprises have been developed on the basis of domestic 
research and design institutes; they are regulated by standards of the legislation and 
the authorities of the Russian government. 
 
Experts believe that the import substitution policy should generally have a positive 
impact not only on the production of instruments and other equipment, but also on 
other components of all branches of Russian nanoindustry. Undoubtedly, the import 
substitution for nanoindustry is not a short-term policy; it has been not fully 
comprehended and implemented yet, but it rapidly gains power and scale. 
 
The integration unions, such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), the 
Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) 
and BRICS, are of great importance for overcoming the modern problems of 
Russian nanoindustry development. At the beginning of 2015 the analysis of current 
state and development of nanoindustry was carried out, its problems and barriers in 
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the EAEU countries were disclosed (Information about the results, 2014).
 
 So, there 
is a low demand from the business, government agencies and institutions on 
nanoindustry products along with a high share of import in it. According to the 
Eurasian Economic Commission (EEC), the volume of import nano-enabled goods 
is estimated at the level of 15 billion dollars per a year, or 5% of the total. 
Nevertheless, it was revealed that participating countries conduct consecutive work 
through adoption of national programs and initiatives on the development of this 
sphere; and this work was estimated as capable to provide increasing the 
competitiveness of many branches, especially the manufacturing industry. 
Moreover, cooperation in the NBIC-technologies creates new industries and can be a 
successful way of overall progress of EAEU countries’ industrial complexes. 
 
Within the Eurasian integration there is a successful experience of the interstate 
innovative cooperation in nanoindustry. Russian–Kazakhstan Nanotechnology Fund 
has been established, the series of scientific and technical programs of the Belarus-
Russia Union State is being implemented, the Non-profit partnership “International 
Innovative Center of Nanotechnologies of the CIS Countries” has been created and 
others. There are more and more examples of successful project implementation on 
the basis of megacollaborations in the industrial sector (a series of projects involving 
companies within the RUSNANO group). 
On the basis of the results of analysis mentioned above the EEC has prepared the 
offers on development of the EAEU countries interaction in the sphere of 
nanoindustry providing measures for deepening of scientific and technical 
cooperation, creating the joint ventures for manufacturing the innovative and hi-tech 
products based on nanotechnologies. It is supposed that these offers will be issued in 
the form of recommendations and after multilateral coordination will be submitted 
for consideration by governing bodies of the integration union. 
 
In the current situation the following question arises: “Is there any chance for Russia 
to become one of the technological leaders in the future?”. It is impossible to answer 
this question unambiguously. One can find the answer from the optimistic and 
pessimistic points of view.  
 
An optimistic point of view. Despite a slight gap to the leaders, in 2007 Russia 
adopted a strategy of forming a nanotechnology industry and defined its main goals, 
as a response to one of the major challenges of the XXI century. At the first stage 
(10-12 years) it is impossible to achieve the full development of nanoindustry within 
the dynamics evolution model of a new technological mode. Optimum period of 
time is from 20 to 25 years. The first stage groundwork is potentially capable to 
accelerate or slow down the process of nanoindustrialization. Technological reserves 
are developed in SR&ED, education and industrial sectors, as well as in defense, 
information and communication sectors that have become the main exporters of 
Russian nanoindustry production. 
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A pessimistic point of view. The lag in competition, weakness and caution, 
opportunism of interests, administrative barriers, redundancy of mediators, desire to 
shift the burden of innovation at the state and so prevent to reduce the costs of new 
technologies implementation. The stronger is the monopoly and bureaucracy, the 
weaker is competition, the less are its effects, – and the more are the barriers to the 
initial incentives to innovative economic development. This creates the mechanisms 
of nanoindustry development restraint. 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
The analysis of Russian nanoindustry current state and unstable dynamics in 
conditions of economic and political sanctions, and unstable external environment 
allows making the following concluding observations: 
– Russian government retains the support system of national nanoindustry in 
accordance with the general strategic goals of the economic policy, but it replaces 
emphasis, moving mostly from investment to guarantees, to the institutional and 
metrological maintenance; 
– Phased persistent transition from the domination of companies’ and 
projects’ budgetary financing to private investing in companies and special 
economic zones on the basis of systems of participation and corporatization is 
required; 
– Imposition of external sanctions against Russia has led to the priority of 
private equity investment funds in the development of national and international 
nanoindustry, to the restructuring of investment subjects’ composition and 
investment proportions; 
– Russian companies refuse to cooperate with unreliable partners; seek to 
form new clusters and strategic alliances in nanoindustry sphere, review inefficient 
agreements and treaties with foreign companies; 
– Companies of Russian nanoindustry reorient to new suppliers of 
equipment and materials, form the new “related groups” for cooperation and 
collaboration; 
– Along with the growth of import substitution it has been expressed 
willingness to intensify the export activity in Russian nanoindustry; 
– State target programs and projects with state participation on the 
developing and introducing of functionally complete system of domestic special and 
measuring equipment, and elaborating scientific instrumentation industry for the 
needs of nano-industrialization and NBIC-convergence in various spheres of life and 
sectors of the economy are implemented; 
– Restructuring a global network of partners on criteria for parity of 
responsibility and profitability, sovereignty and urgency in order to prevent and 
overcome the problems of isolation and backwardness of each party cooperating in 
the global nano-industrialization process is continued; 
– Modernizing the institutional framework and actual activating the 
government policy in the sphere of innovation along with the systematic stimulation 
O. Inshakov, E. Inshakova 
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to accelerate the innovative processes in the sphere of nanotechnology has been 
initiated. 
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